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 Considerations of survivability and resiliency have always been of importance in the 
design and analysis of military systems. Over the past two decades, the importance of 
survivability and resiliency has expanded beyond military systems to include public 
networks and infrastructure systems. The analysis and assessment of networked systems 
with respect to survivability has become particularly acute in recent years, as attested to by 
a growing technical literature on the subject. 
 In this paper, we bring these considerations of survivability and resiliency to bear on 
spacecraft and space-based networks. We develop a framework for comparing the 
survivability and resiliency of different space architectures, namely that of a monolithic 
design and a distributed (or networked) space system architecture. There are multiple 
metrics along which different space architectures can be benchmarked and compared. We 
argue that if survivability and resiliency are not accounted for, then the evaluation process is 
likely to be biased in favor of monolithic spacecraft. We show that if in a given context 
survivability and resiliency are an important requirement for a particular customer, then a 
distributed architecture is more likely to satisfy this requirement than a monolithic 
spacecraft design. 
 We discuss in the context of our framework different classes of threats, as well as the 
high-frequency and low-frequency system response to (or coping strategies with) these 
shocks or damaging events. We illustrate the importance of this characterization for a 
formal definition of survivability and resiliency and a proper quantitative analysis of the 
subject. Finally, we propose in future work to integrate our framework with a design tool 
that allows the exploration of the design trade-space of distributed space architecture and 
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I.  Introduction: background on survivability and resil iency 
 
A. Survivability and resiliency in the technical literature 
 
URVIVABILITY and resiliency are largely used in the scientific and technical literature as multi-disciplinary 
concepts in a variety of contexts and often with different meanings. A lexical search in the academic database 
ISI Web of Knowledge illustrates the growing frequency of the use of these concepts in the technical lterature. 
Figure 1 summarizes the results of our literature search: the first documented use of these concepts§ started in the 
1960’s with a handful of papers published on these subjects in the first decade, followed by a dramatic increase in 
interest in these subjects in the mid 1990’s and that continues till today (over 75 papers where published on 
survivability in 2006 and more than 380 on resiliency). The same trend was found when the search probed for these 
concepts in the keywords of the publications instead of the titles. In addition, the interest in one particular topic, 
survivable or resilient networks, appeared in the 1980’s and followed the same exponential trend (83 publications 
were dedicated to survivable or resilient networks in 2006). 
 







































































































































Figure 1. Survivability and resilience/resiliency publications evolution from 1960 
  
 These searches conducted on ISI Web of Knowledge also give some indication about the academic disciplines 
that grapple with survivability and resiliency. The concept of survivability is traditionally associated with 
engineering whereas resiliency is more often found a  discussed in environmental sciences as well as in 
psychology and psychiatry. Note that the words resilience or resiliency can be equally found in papers, with no 
difference in meaning. As a consequence, only the word resiliency will be used in this paper. 
 
 
                                                           
§ Used in the titles of technical publications. 
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B. Survivability concept 
 
1. Military context 
 
 Survivability has become increasingly important sice the 1960’s 1 as a strategic concept for the military. It is 
applied to platforms (e.g. aircraft), people, systems (e.g. military network), and now more generally to missions. 
 Several papers show this evolution, from one of the first attempts to assess survivability linked to an aircraft in 
1967 1, 2 to some more general definitions 3, 4, 5, 6 as the one provided by the DoD Regulation 5000.2-R 6: 
“[survivability is] the capability of a system and crew to avoid or withstand a man-made hostile enviro ment 
without sustaining an impairment of its ability to accomplish its designated mission. Survivability consists of 
susceptibility, vulnerability, and recoverability.” Susceptibility is “the degree to which a weapon system is open to 
effective attack because of one or more inherent weakn ss”; vulnerability is “the characteristic of a system that 
causes it to suffer a definite degradation (loss or reduction of capability to perform its designated mission) as a result 
of having being subjected to a certain (defined) level of effects in an unnatural (man-made) hostile environment”; 
recoverability is “the ability, following combat damage, to take emergency action to prevent the loss of the system, 
to reduce personnel casualties, or to regain weapon system combat mission capabilities” 
 Several publications have addressed the issue of survivability of military networks, a growing field since the 
1980’s and 1990’s 7, defining survivability of a military network as the “ability to maintain communication among 
the nodes when it is subject to deliberate destruction”. 
 
2. Engineering context 
 
 During the past two decades, the concept of survivability has spread over other areas than the military, 
especially to electrical and electronic engineering with an emphasis on software, telecommunications, and 
information systems. In particular, survivability has become of major interest for network systems design rs since 
society has become significantly dependent on a variety of networks, leading to severe consequences in the case of 
network system disruptions or failures. 
 While the use of survivability is widespread within the technical and scientific community, no definition is 
unanimously adopted. Westmark (2004) 8 compiled 53 definitions of survivability from different papers to provide a 
definition template: survivability, according to Westmark, is “the ability of a given system with a given intended 
usage to provide a pre-specified minimum level of service in the event of one or more pre-specified threats”. Present 
in Westmark’s list, one of the more cited definitions is provided by Ellison (1999) 9: survivability according to 
Ellison is the “capability of a system to fulfill its mission, in a timely manner, in the presence of attacks, failures, or 
accidents”. Knight (2003) 10, while also providing survivability definitions in the telecommunications and software 
field, found this definition not precise and formal enough. Knight attempts to provide a formal definitio  of 
survivability based on six quantitative parameters (or sextuple). He characterizes a system as “survivable if it 
complies with its survivability specification,” and the survivability specification is mathematically defined, 
gathering all acceptable levels of service from thesystem, the associated services values and relative values 
(perceived by the user), its probabilistic requirements and its possible transitions in a specified operating 
environment. 
 Accordingly, survivability definitions teeter between informal and formal definitions, and occasionally, but not 
always, survivability is defined in probabilistic terms. But, as observed from the previous definitions, survivability is 
context-specific, related to the system studied, its environment, and the services and requirements the user has 
chosen. This specificity explains why often survivability seems to be a more generic word defined or measured in 
terms of other notions, like availability, performance, security, reliability, traffic capacity, connectivity, etc. 
However, contrary to reliability linked to normal environment, survivability is related to the system response with 
respect to abnormal conditions.  
 Also, note that the existing definitions sometimes include different concepts, and particularly the notion of 
recovery, recoverability or restoration. In some papers, recovery is a subset of survivability, whereas in others, 
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C. Resiliency concept 
 
 Resilience or resiliency is also a concept with multiple definitions. As explained in Caralli (2006) 11, resiliency 
was first used to describe a property of a physical m terial. It is “the capability of a strained body to recover its size 
and shape after deformation caused especially by compressive stress” according to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary. 
Resiliency has expanded beyond this physical definition to other disciplines and particularly in ecology 12 and 
psychology where “resiliency refers to the ability of people to bounce back from adversity” 11. It is now applied also 
to engineered networks and organizations.  
 However, despite the diversity of disciplines interested in resiliency, three elements are present across most 
definitions according to Caralli: the ability to “change when a force is enacted, [to] perform adequatly or minimally 
while the force is in effect, [to] return to a predefined expected normal state whenever the forces rel nts or is 
rendered ineffective”. Thus time becomes an important p rameter in resiliency estimation, accounting for the whole 
system response, from the shock to the after-shock. Finally, resiliency is an emergent property of thesystem, i.e. 
resiliency is a property of the system as a whole, at a macroscopic scale. 
 
D. Resiliency versus survivability 
 
 Survivability and resiliency have been compared in several papers due to their close nature. According to the 
ResiliNets Initiative 13, resiliency is the “ability of the network to provide and maintain an acceptable level of 
service in the face of various challenges to normal operations”. Resiliency is considered “as survivability plus the 
ability to tolerate unusual but legitimate traffic load”. Consequently, resiliency is seen as a superset of survivability.  
 Other papers considered also resiliency as a superet of survivability, but in another respect, perhaps more 
relevant: Caralli (2006) 11 views resiliency as an extension of survivability (which deals only with the shock) to 
include “risk prevention as well as restoration of normal processes once a disruption has relented”. Time 
dependency is included in the definition of resiliency and a system will be said resilient, with respect to a threat and 
a service, considering its response before, during a d after the abnormal condition(s). In the following, our 
definition will be based on the definition from Caralli. 
 
E. Survivability and resiliency models 
 
 Several models have been proposed to compute survivability of various systems. Westmark (2004) 8 provides 
an extensive literature review of these models. Different models to compute survivability or resiliency are used, such 
as state machines, trellis graphs, Markov processes, Monte Carlo simulations, topology of networks, etc. No 
particular trend can be attributed to each considered field. As for the definitions survivability or resiliency, no model 
is unanimously adopted. 
 
II.  Survivability and resiliency definitions – System response 
 
 Contrary to reliability, survivability deals with degraded states of performance. Indeed, reliability is only a 
binary concept, where the system is either fully operational, or failed under normal operations. Survivab lity allows 
a great level of precision in describing the system’s performance degradation facing abnormal conditions.  
 As stated before, survivability is defined in a certain environment, with respect to threat(s) and a performance 
index chosen by the user to assess the performance of th  system considered. As this definition is context-specific, 
the environment, the threat(s), the performance indx will have to be specified each time an analysis is conducted. 
Figure 2 illustrates the system response facing a shock. The survivability of the system is computed with the 
performance degradation ∆P. Note that survivability deals only with the immediate reaction of the system at the 
shock, and can thus be conceived of as the high frequency response of the system to the shock. On a side note, 
particularly desirable for high-availability systems such as communications satellites, graceful degraation allows 
the system to keep operating and continues to provide some services by staging its performance degradation over 
time. 
 The response of the system after the shock is captured by the recoverability of the system, which in s mple 
terms can be thought of as a time parameter τ modeling the necessary time for the system to return within a certain 
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percentage of the initial level of performance (e.g. 95% response). Here again, recoverability can be conceived of as 
the low frequency system response to a shock. 



















Figure 2. System response during and following a shock 
 
 




 According to the previous definitions, we want to assess and compare the survivability of spacecraft and space-
based networks, facing threats and with respect to some performance measures. We call a co-located space-based 
network a cluster of satellites having the capability of communicating between each other, and thus being able to 
share resources. For example, the mission data process r (MDP) can be divided between several satellites, these 
MDPs collaborating to fulfill the function, or some small MDP acting as a back-up of the main processor located on 
one satellite of the network. 
 This paper addresses survivability considerations; re iliency will be treated in future work. We develop in this 













Figure 3. Framework presentation 
 
 
 As a first step to demonstrate the capability of our model, we limit the scope of this study to the following 
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actual field data). Two types of space system archite tures are considered in this work: the traditional monolith 
spacecraft and a co-located space-based network. From the obtained performance degradation, the survivabil ty of 
the two architectures is compared.  
  
B. Statistical data analysis and hazard rate modeling 
 
 The stochastic laws modeling the degradation of each subsystem were deduced in previous works by Castet nd 
Saleh (2008a, 2008b) 14, 15: from the SpaceTrak® database 16, a statistical analysis was conducted to determine the 
distribution hazard rates of the satellite and its subsystems. Due to the censored nature of the sample composed of 
1745 satellites and about 870 associated anomalies or failures, a Kaplan-Meier estimator was used to obtain 
estimated reliability functions of satellites or sub ystems, as well as estimated probabilities of transition between 
degraded states. Weibull distributions were chosen to fit the Kaplan plots representing the empirical d ta, due to the 
flexible nature of the Weibull distribution to model time-dependent hazard rates. Weibull distributions resulted in 
excellent fit with the empirical data. 
 In space-based networks, the different spacecraft an be composed of possible different subsystems. Thus there 
is a real necessity of obtaining reliability and probability data at a subsystem level. From the database, 13 
subsystems were considered: 
– Attitude control 
• Gyro/Sensor/Reaction wheel 
• Ion/Electric thruster 
• Thruster/Fuel 
– Beam/Antenna operation/deployment 
– Control Processor 
– Mechanisms/Structures/Thermal 
– Payload Instrument/Amplifier/On-board data/Computer/Transponder 
– Power 
• Battery/Cell 
• Electrical distribution 
• Solar Array Deployment 
• Solar Array Operating 
– Telemetry Tracking and Command 
– Unknown 
Several degraded states were considered at a subsystem level: 4 anomaly event classes described in the following. 
– Class I: satellite retirement due to subsystem failure 
– Class II: major non-repairable failure that affects the operation of a satellite or its subsystem on a 
permanent basis 
– Class III: major non-repairable failure that causes the lossof redundancy to the operation of a satellite or 
its subsystems on a permanent basis 
– Class IV: minor/temporary/repairable failure 
From these subsystems and anomaly event classes, 54 Weibull hazard rate models were developed according to the 
technique described above. These models are part of a multi-state failure analysis conducted previously by the 
authors (Castet and Saleh, 2008b) 15. 
 
C. Stochastic Petri Net 
 
Our model uses Stochastic Petri Nets (SPNs). Invented in 1962 by C. A. Petri, a Petri net is a mathematical 
representation of a discrete distributed system (concurrent processes). A Petri net is composed of tokens (relevant 
entities of the system), places (possible states of the entity), transitions (rules for token movements) and arcs (links 
between places and transitions). The combination of the locations of the tokens, called the marking, uniq ely 
characterizes the state of the system. SPNs compose a subfamily of the Petri nets, adding a stochastic behavior 
through adjustable randomness of the transitions (exponential, Weibull, normal, lognormal… distributions). The 
reader is referred to Haas 17 for additional details on stochastic Petri nets. Figure 4 provides an illustrative example 
of a SPN. 
 



















Figure 4. Example of a stochastic Petri net 
 
 
Two particular arcs are used in the model: inhibitor arc and enabler arc. An inhibitor arc prevents a ransition 
from firing when a token is present in the place linking the transition and the place. An enabler enables the transition 
contrary to an inhibitor, as presented by Volovoi (2006) 18. Examples of an inhibitor and enabler are presented in 
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In Figure 5a, we can see the evolution of the system including an inhibitor: even if the upper transition is faster 
than the lower one, the presence of a token activating the inhibitor at the initial time prevents the upper transition to 
fire after 1 sec. The lower transition fires after 2 sec, deactivating the inhibitor and enabling the upper transition 
which fires one second later. Figure 5b models the same system behavior with an enabler: the upper transi ion is 
activated by the enabler after the 2 sec needed by the lower transition to fire. 
 
We choose SPNs as our analytical and modeling tool over Markov Chains (MCs), because 1) stochastic Petri 
nets allow local modeling unlike Markov Chains which are confined to a global approach, and 2) time dependencies 
and local clocks are much more easily implemented in stochastic Petri nets than in Markov Chains. Local an lysis is 
important in our study to model the interaction between satellite subsystems and system levels. Time dep ndency is 
needed to model the evolution of satellite subsystem  hazard rates through time (no constant hazard rates as seen 
before). However, because of the local nature of SPNs, Monte Carlo simulations are necessary to generate a 
representative behavior of the stochastic transitions. Due to the complexity of our SPN models described in the 




Four states were considered at the system level: 
o operational:   0 – 5% performance loss 
o minor degradation:  5 – 35% performance loss 
o major degradation:  35 – 85% performance loss 
o failed:    85 – 100% performance loss 
These states generate the survivability level of precision of our model. The probabilities of being in these four states 
are the output of the SPN model. Comparisons between the probabilities obtained for each of the two architectures 
allow a survivability analysis of the architectures considered.  
 
In the case of a monolith architecture, the following rules are used to link the subsystem and system levels: 
o the system is in the operational state if all the subsystems are in their operational states 
o the system is in the failed state if one subsystem is in Class I state 
o the Class IV and Class III state of the subsystems do not have a direct effect on the system level 
o the Class II state can lead to minor, major degradation or failed system states according to probabilities 
peculiar to each subsystem 
 
 According to the stochastic laws inferred for each subsystem as Weibull distribution hazard rates and the 
previous rules, a stochastic Petri net model is developed to model a monolith satellite facing endogenus failures 








































Figure 6. SPN model of a monolith spacecraft: multi-state failure model linking subsystems failures to system 
failures  
 
 Concerning the co-located space-based network architecture, a particular case is chosen as a demonstration for 
the developed SPN tool: two networked spacecraft are considered, the first one containing all the 13 subsystems (i.e. 
a monolith one with the ability to talk to other satellites; we call BOX1 all the subsystems but the Tlemetry 
Tracking and Command (TTC) subsystem), the second having the necessary subsystems for a satellite (called here 
BOX2: attitude control, power, antenna and mechanism/structures/thermal) plus a TTC subsystem acting as a single 
TTC “redundancy”. Indeed we want to observe the effcts of a spacecraft having the ability to tap intothe resources 
of another one in case of the damage of its own subsystems. Some rules are also used to link subsystem to system 
level: 
o System Failed: 
– If BOX1 Failed 
– If TTC1 Failed &   TTC2 Failed 
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o System Major: 
– If BOX1 Major 
– If TTC1 Failed & TTC2 Major 
– If TTC1 Major &    TTC2 Failed 
                   or TTC2 Major 
                            or BOX2 Failed 
o System Minor: 
– If BOX1 Minor 
– If TTC1 Minor & TTC2 Minor 
 
Figure 7 presents the SPN model for the co-located space-based network architecture, BOX1 and TTC1 constituting 








































Figure 7. SPN model of a co-located space-based network architecture: multi-state failure model linkin g 















Validating partially the model is done by evaluating the monolith reliability, by multiplying the proba ilities of 
being in the Class I state for the 13 subsystems in the SPN model. Figure 8 presents the comparison between the 
original Kaplan-Meier estimated satellite reliability to the reliability given by the SPN model. The SPN model 
output closely approximates the spacecraft reliability f eld data (or more precisely the Kaplan-Meier estimate of the 
spacecraft reliability based on the censored field data). The SPN model output is significantly accurate over the first 
eight years of spacecraft operation, and remains within 1% of the field data over 16 years. 
 
 





1. Monolith architecture 
 
Running the Monte Carlo simulation of the SPN model in the case of a monolith architecture provides the 
evolution in time of the probabilities of the system being in operational or different failed states (i.e., operational, 
minor and major degradation, failed). Figure 9 present  these results. 
 
 




Figure 9. State probabilities results in the case of a monolith architecture 
 
 
Figure 9 reads as follows: consider for example a monolith spacecraft after six years on-orbit. It has a 78% 
likelihood of being fully operational, 6% of being in minor degradation, 8.5% of being in major degradation and 
7.5% of being in a failed state. The probability of being fully operational decrease quickly the first year (while the 
probability of being in the other states increase quickly) and at a slower rate on the following years.   
Note that even if the x-axis is the time, the studied notion stays survivability. Each point in the plot gives a 
probability of the magnitude of the degradation of the performance ∆P any time. Recall there are no repairs, 
maintenance policies or recoverability involved in this analysis. 
 
2. Space-based network architecture and survivability comparison of the two architectures 
 
Running the same simulation for a co-located space-bas d architecture leads to the same kind of plots. Figures 
10a and 10b present two of the four plots resulting o the comparison between the two architectures for the 
operational and the failed states.  
 
 




Figure 10a. Comparison between monolith and co-located space-based architectures for the operational state 
 
Figure 10a is confined to the operational state and clearly shows that the co-located space-based network 
gives better results at any point time than the monolith spacecraft: in simple terms, a co-located space-based network 
is more likely to remain (or be found) in an operational state than the traditional monolithic spacecraft. The 
following Figure 10b shows the result for the failed state. A more precise analysis of these results is provided shortly, 
following Figure 11, which presents a more exhaustive and compact comparison between the two architectures. 
 




Figure 10b. Comparison between monolith and co-located space-based architectures for the failed state 
 
Here again, the advantage of the two-networked satellite architecture is clear: a co-located space-based 
network is less likely to be in a failed state than the traditional monolithic spacecraft. The four plots are combined in 
one as shown in Figure 11: the figure represents the difference in the resulting probabilities of being i  any of the 
fours states between the two architectures. The y-axis is the difference in percentage point between the two 
architectures. 
• For the operational state, the difference is positive: the probability of being in an operational state is higher 
at any point in time for a co-located space-based network than for a monolith spacecraft. In particular, it is 
greater by about 4.5% after 16 years, that is, instead of having 67.5% likelihood of being in an operational 
state after 16 years of operation for the traditional monolithic architecture, the networked architecture has a 
72% likelihood of being in an operational state. Note that this additional probability of remaining in a  
operational state can be of significant importance to the owner of the system or end-users of the services 
provided by the system. 
• For the minor, major degradation and failed states, the difference is negative, meaning that the probabilities 
to be in these states are lower for a co-located space-based network than for a monolith one, with a bigger 
difference for the failed state (about 3.5% less after 16 years). The same interpretation as in the previous 
bullet point applies as well in these cases. 
Consequently, the co-located space-based network architecture is more survivable than the monolith spacecraft at 
any time in this context, i.e., with respect to TTC failure. No other more general conclusion on the survivability of a 
co-located space-based network architecture can be i ferred from this demonstration study. 
 Note that in this context, the difference in state probabilities between the two architectures increase with 
time, that is, the co-located space-based network becomes increasingly more survivable with time compared with the 
monolithic spacecraft. 
 









 In this paper, we first provided a literature review on survivability and resiliency, showing that despite the 
increasing popularity of the two concepts, no definitio s or models are unanimously adopted within the technical 
and scientific community. Assimilated to high and low frequency response of the system facing a shock, 
survivability and resiliency are defined according to the specific context of a given study, including the system’s 
environment, threats, user services and performance measures. 
 Following our literature review, we developed a survivability tool for space systems using stochastic Petri nets. 
In the case of endogenous failures, the SPN transitio  laws are based on actual satellite subsystems hazard rates 
given by a statistical lifetime data analysis (Kaplan-Meier estimator). We chose a particular configuration of a co-
located space-based network to demonstrate the capability of the tool, using Monte Carlo simulations to generate 
representative results of stochastic behavior of the spacecraft endogenous anomalies and failures. A comparison 
between the two architectures leads to the conclusion that in the context and configuration we have chosen, the co-
located space-based network is more survivable than the traditional monolith spacecraft. In other words, if in a given 
context survivability is an important requirement for a particular customer or end-user of a space asst, then a 
networked space-based architecture is more likely to sa isfy this requirement than a traditional monolithic spacecraft. 
This observation has important implications for the design and acquisition of space systems. Consider the following: 
there are multiple metrics along which different proposed space system designs are benchmarked and compared, 
cost being one important factor. It is likely that a networked space-based architecture will incur a cost penalty 
compared with a monolithic spacecraft, even on an iso-performance basis. Therefore if one of the advantages of a 
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space-based network, namely its survivability, is not accounted for, then the evaluation process is likely to be biased 
in favor of the monolithic spacecraft (on a cost basis).  
 In future work, we propose to further develop and i tegrate our survivability tool with a space system design 
trade-space exploration tool. In addition, we propose to add resiliency considerations while accounting for repair and 
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